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PERIODIC TENANCIES
PHILIP MARCUSt
T HE judicial process has the realm of science for its only rival in in-
ventive genius. Distinction, the bane of the law student, is often the
mother of justice. Legal fiction is almost as prolific as its more well
known brother, the novel, although its authorship is generally less identi-
fiable.
The periodic tenancy in most of its forms is a legal fiction. It has
been defined as:
"An estate from period to period is an estate which will continue for suc-
cessive periods of a year, or successive periods of a fraction of a year, unless it
is terminated."'-
The early common law called such a tenancy one from year to year,-
but since at the present day tenancies of uncertain duration are often
measured by periods less than a year it seems more accurate to speak of
such tenancies as leaseholds from period to period3
The genesis of the periodic tenancy is to be found, probably, in the
tenancy at will. But the importance of the periodic tenancy has in-
creased while that of the tenancy at will has diminished. There has
been a tendency to regard tenancies at will as non-existent and as assimi-
lated into periodic tenancies, at least for the purpose of a notice to
quit. But in view of the common statutory provision for a definite period
of notice to quit in the case of tenancies at will or at sufferance as well
as in that of periodic tenancies the pull toward such assimilation is
t Member of the New York Bar.
1. EsTA TEmT, PROPERTr (1936) § 20.
2. This form of tenancy was fairly well known by the 16th Century. Babbitt, Tenancy
from Year to Year (1930) 8 TJFAs L. 1rzv 325.
3. Except for the tenancy from year to year the period is normally from one rent
date to the next due date.
4. In 1774 a member of the bar boldly argued that there was not, according to modem
decisions, any such estate at wi, every tenant being a tenant for a year or more. Co.
Lim. -270b.
In the 19th Century a learned commentator said:
"Estates at will, in the strict sense, have become almost extinguished, under the op=ation
of judicial decisions. Lord Mansfield observed, that an infinite quantity of land was
holden in England without lease. They were all, therefore, in a technical .snse, estates at
will; but such estates are said to exist only notionally, and, where no certain term is
agreed on, they are considered to be tenancies from year to year... ? 4 Ki,"r Com. *111.
"A holding merely at the will of the landlord, according to the ancient meaning of
the term 'tenancy at will' is an estate unknown in modem times, unles where created by
express agreement between the parties, or by dear implication. All such tenancies are, for
the purpose of a notice to quit, deemed to be tenancies from year to yearY Hurd v.
Whitsett, 4 Colo. 77, 82 (1878). Accord: State Bank v. Herron, 111 Iowa 25, 82 N. W.
430 (1900); Hunter v. Frost, 47 Minn. 1, 49 N. W. 327 (1391).
FORDHA M LAW REVIEW
limited.5 It would seem equally improper to categorize periodic tenancies
as merely a form of a tenancy at will.6 The established place which the
periodic tenancy occupies in the classification of estates in land and
in the law of landlord and tenant merits its consideration as something
more than a tenancy at will. There are several incidents attached to
this form of tenancy which are not reproduced in tenancies at will.'
These two forms of tenancies, moreover, are treated separately in the
statutes of many states. 8
A tenancy from year to year was probably the earliest form of a
periodic tenancy, and the phrase, "from year to year", has acquired a
generic connotation covering periodic tenancies generally." Law is
largely a mirror of conditions existing at the time the rule of law is
formulated: the moving van, even horse-drawn, was not a common sight
prior to this and the preceding century. Occupancy was thought of in
terms of a year; and, to make full use of agricultural premises possession
of some extended nature was necessary. 0 If the progenitor of the periodic
5. In some states there are statutory requirements for a notice to quit of some length
to terminate a fenancy at sufferance and one at will, but periodic tenancies are not men-
tioned. Again, a statutory division of estates may not include periodic tenancies. In
these states it is not surprising to find periodic tenancies regarded as a species of a
tenancy at will. "The tenancy . . . was what might properly be termed a tenancy at
will from month to month." Boucher v. St. George, 88 Mont. 162, 168, 293 Pac. 315, 317
(1925). In Hunter v. Frost, 47 Minn. 1, 49 N. W. 327 (1891), cited supra note 4, it was
argued that the omission of any reference to periodic tenancies implied their non-existence.
The court rejected this argument although holding that the statutory notice to quit In
respect to tenancies at will was applicable on the ground that at the time the statute was
enacted tenancies at will were hardly known. This tenancy, however, said the court, not
being one at will the notice must be for the terminal date of the period.
6. See letter of J. D. Berman, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 25, 1936, p. 974, col. 2, discussing
such an assertion by another correspondent.
It is not uncommon to find periodic tenancies referred to as "general tenancies at will"
and tenancies at will as "strict tenancies at will." See KEoG, SvmmaRY PaocaEiNos
(1932) c. 5; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 3-1616. In Bradley v. Covel, 4 Cow. (N. Y.
1825), the court said: "A tenancy at will is held to be a tenancy from year to year, merely
for the sake of a notice to quit." Accord: Nichols v. Williams, 8 Cow. 13 (N. Y. 1826). See
Bennock v. Whipple, 12 Me. 346 (1835).
7. For example, notice to quit, right to assign without lessor's consent, effect of death
of either party.
8. Enumeration and definition of estates in land in some statutes set tenancies from
period to period apart from those at will. See hmD. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) §
3-1615; MONT. REv. CODFs AhN. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 6723; ORE. CODE.-ANN.
(Supp. 1935) § 5-202. Other statutes have differing provisions in respect to notice to
quit. CoLO. STAT. ANr. (Michie, 1935) c. 70, § 7; DnL. REV. CoDE. (1935) § 4571; Mo.
STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1932) c. 12, § 2584; R. I. GEN. LAws (1923) c. 385, § 1 et seq.
9. See German State Bank v. Herron, 111 Iowa 25, 82 N. W. 430 (1900); Elliott v.
Birrell, 127 Va. 166, 102 S. E. 762 (1920). This was formerly more true than it is today.
For the purpose of this article the term "from year to year" is used to denote a periodic
tenancy in which the periods are for a year.
10. In Roe d. Bree v. Lees, 2 W. BI. 1171, 96 Eng. Reprints 691 (1777), counsel al-
leged a custom in respect of open fields of a holding from three years to three years. The
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tenancy was the farm holding, the child which was created while never
disavowing its parentage has extended the scope of its patrimony to
include realty held for dwelling and business purposes. In the statutes
of several states the difference in the nature of agrarian lands and other
kinds of realty is recognized in a variation in the requisite notice to quit
as well as in the presumption employed in determining the length of the
term.
For many purposes it makes no difference how the periodic tenancy
is created. But such tenancies are not fashioned from the same mold.
The periodic tenancy arises in several situations which can, perhaps, be
blocked off into four categories:
1. Where the parties expressly create a tenancy to run from
year to year or for some other successive periodic unit."'
2. Where there is no original letting for a definite period and
the acts of the parties create a tenancy the duration of which is not
predetermined, but the year or a fraction thereof is the base upon
which the rent is paid.' 2
3. Where there is a valid lease for a definite term but a holdover
takes place and with the consent of the landlord the tenant con-
tinues to occupy the premises paying periodic rent. 3
4. Where there is a lease which is invalid but the lessee occupies
and pays periodic rent. 4
There are perhaps two main problems which have vexed the courts
in connection with periodic tenancies. One question is whether there is
one continuous tenancy or a series of separate tenancies each one of which
arises with the commencement of each period. The other problem is
that of notice: what, if any, notice must be given to terminate the ten-
ancy. The notice to quit is generally the focal point of any discussion
concerning this form of tenancy since it is the question most often
litigated." The answer to the first question, however, may determine
judges in dicta were not agreed whether course of husbandry would govern the length of
notice. Cf. Larkin v. Avery, 23 Conn. 304 (1854).
11. Pugsley v. Aikin, 11 N. Y. 494 (1354) (year); Hoffman v. Van Allen, 3 Miz-c. 99,
22 N. Y. Supp. 369 (C. P. 1893) (month); Queens Club Gardens Estates v. Bigncll,
[19241 1 K. B. 117 (week). Cf. Western Transportation Co. v. Lansing, 49 N. Y. 499
(1872). In Washington a statute abolishes tenancies from year to year other than thoa
created by written agreement. WAsH. REV. STAT. Azn. (Remington, 1932) § 10618. See
p. 170, infra.
12. Reece & Treece v. Leslie, 103 Ark. 127, 150 S. W. 579 (1912); Petsch v. Biggs, 31
Minn. 392 18 N. W. 101 (1884). See p. 173, infra.
13. Pickerill v. Home Realty Co., 79 Ind. App. 447, 136 N. E. 830 (1922); Heckel v.
Griese, 12 N. J. Alisc. 211, 171 Ati. 14S (Sup. Ct. 1934). See p. 177, infra.
14. Wmeburgh v. Toledo Corp., 123 Ohio St. 219, 181 N. E. 20 (1932). See p.
181, infra.
15. Inasmuch as this form of leasehold is the result of a judicial anaesthetic to the un-
certainties of a tenancy at will, as a natural consequence a notice to quit should be neces-
sary to terminate the tenancy.
1938]
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whether a count for rent of one period may be joined with a count for
another period. 6 It may, also, be decisive of the liability of a lessor for
injuries arising from defects in the premises, 1 and of the question
whether summary proceedings will lie for a default occurring in a period
prior to the one in which suit is brought.' Normally the predominant
factor in determining the length of the period is the interval between
periodic rent payments but the presumption arising from the presence
of such interval is rebuttable by other circumstances.1 9
. It should be noted that while normally periodic tenancies consist of
periods which may be evenly divided into a year, i.e., aliquot periods,
such as a month or a week, this need not necessarily be so. If rent be
paid regularly for fractional periods of a year a periodic tenancy from
one such period to another such period would seem to exist.20
I The Periodic Tenancy
Created by Express Agreement of the Parties
In an agrarian economy it was probably not uncommon for two
parties to agree that one hold land of another for an indefinite period
from year to year.2" Land was plentiful and property mainly unim-
proved. Ordinarily it would not be important to the lessor to terminate
such tenancy quickly while to a tenant who had sown his seed and planted
his crops a summary termination of his tenancy would have been disas-
trous. Under such conditions it is not surprising that the common law
16. Pugsley v. Aikin, 11 N. Y. 494 (1854).
17. The argument is that a lessor is responsible foY the condition of the premises at
the time of the beginning of the tenancy, and if each period is to be considered a new
leasing he would be liable for a nuisance existing at the start of each of such periods.
Dank Bros. C. & C. Co. v. Leavitt, 109 Ill. App. 385 (1903) (monthly letting-new lotting
each month). Contra: Strong v. Soodvoisky, 141 Ill. App. 183 (1908); Bowen v. Ander-
son [1893] 1 Q. B. 164 (weekly tenancy). Does each holding over by a tenant for years
constitute a new and separate term distinct from that which preceded or followed-as
affecting liability for nuisances and defects on leased premises? See Notes (1910) 25
L. R. A. (N. S.) 847, 849.
In Gallagher v. Button, 73 Conn. 172 (1900) where there was a parol lease at a monthly
rental and the plaintiff occupied for seven years, it was held error for the court to charge
on the question of contributory negligence that the tenant had had only one month to
learn of the condition of a defective 'fire escape.
18. Notes (1910) 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 851 (as affecting the right to evict or dlstlan).
People ex rel. Chrome Steel Co. v. Paulding, 22 Hun. 91 (N. Y. 1880), held, continuous
for this purpose.
19. In Halliburton v. Molloy, 1 N. S. L. R. 246 (Can. 1854), a monthly tenant after
occupying for some time paid rent monthly for lessor's convenience, held, still a monthly
tenancy.
20. Certainly an express tenancy from ten days to ten days seems feasible. Cf. Jacob
v. Jacob, 125 Misc. 649, 212 N. Y. Supp. 62 (Co. Ct. 1925).
21. Pugsley v. Aikin, 11 N. Y. 494 (1854); Doe v. Mainby, 10 Q.B. 473 (1847).
Quarterly holdings have long been recognized although few instances of such tenancies
are found in the reports. Kemp v. Derret, 3 Camp. 510. 170 Eng. Reprints 1463 (1814).
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required a half year's notice to quit on the part of either party to term-
inate such tenancy.? And this is still said to be the common law re-
quirement to terminate the tenancy.?
However apt such length of notice may have been a few centuries ago,
it would seem hardly appropriate to a tenancy of improved property.
Although precedent calls for a half year's notice it might be that a
court confronted today with this problem would require some period less
than six months or merely a reasonable time at least in cases where a
six months notice would dearly impose hardship upon the lessor or
lessee.24 Statutes in a number of states fix 'a relatively short period of
notice requisite for the termination of periodic tenancies. For the most
part they do not appear to be directed at periodic tenancies created by
express agreement but their language is generally broad enough to cover
this kind of leasehold. But, at any rate, the lease itself may provide
for a different period of notice.2
Express periodic tenancies may be encouraged by a predominantly
tenant's market or a predominantly landlord's market. In each case
one or the other parties may desire to have a tenancy of a higher degree
than one at sufferance or at will yet one which may be readily wound up.
In such case, however, it is likely that the agreement would be from
month to month and, if this is so, merely a month's notice would seem
to be required to terminate the tenancy.2
22. Mlt. Palatine Academy v. Kleinschnitz, 28 IL 133 (1862). See Note (1935) 21 VA,.
L. REv. 582.
23. Ibid.
24. In Hertfield v. Lawton, 108 App App. Div. 113, 95 N. Y. Supp. 451 (3rd Dep't. 1905),
the court, confusing the fact that a surrender can take place at any time with the require-
ment of notice to quit by one of the parties to end the tenancy, said that six months
notice to quit was unnecessary and questioned Pugeley v. Aikin, 11 N. Y. 494 (1854).
25. Archamboult v. Walton, 287 Mass. 216, 191 N. E. 346 (1934); Mayo v. Joyce,
(1920) 1 K. B. 824; In re Threlfall, 16 Ch. D. 274 (18S0) (mortgagee could not termi-
nate the tenancy at any time without notice-liquidation petition by tenant did not end
lease since not a tenancy at will). Lewis v. Baker, [19061 2 K. B. 599 " . . .until such
tenancy should be determined as hereinafter mentioned" at yearly rental payable quar-
terly, terminable by either party on three months notice, held, a yearly tenancy determin-
able by three months notice expiring with any year of the tenancy, not a tenancy for
indefinite term determinable at any time by three months notice.
For an agreement held repugnant to a yearly tenancy, see Gray v. Spyer, (1922] 2
Ch. 22. In California a statute provides that by agreement a notice of not lez3 than
seven days may be provided for at the time the tenancy is created. See CA. CrV. Cona
(Deering, Supp. 1936) § 1946. See also DEL. Rnv. Con- (1915) § 4570; D. C. Con (1929)
tit. 25, c. 10 § 318; MFn. REv. STAT. (1930) c. 10s, § 2; VA. CoD- (Michie, 1930) § 5116;
W. VA. CoDn ANN . (Michie, 1932) § 3655.
26. "And in searching to discover the intent of the law-makers, it may not be im-
proper to consider the circumstances that at the time of the adoption of this act, a condi-
tion of things existed common to all new mining countries while the population iL alter-
nately increasing and decreasing by immigration and emigration, and towns and settle-
ments are building up and decaying in rapid succession, resulting in this, that the rental
19381
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Where there is an express agreement that a tenancy be created to last
for a definite period and thereafter from period to period it may often
be a close question whether this is a lease for two periods. Suppose by
agreement there is to be a lease for one month and then from month to
month? Unless the language is conditional-"if satisfied"-it would
seem preferable to regard this agreement as one for at least two months
since the words used seem to contemplate a tenancy for a time longer
than the first period. And the same result would seem to follow from
an express agreement initially for a periodic tenancy-at least where
not from year to year-since the termination of such tenancies requires
a period's notice. Where there is an express tenancy for one year and
then from year to year however, if a six months' notice were permitted
prior to the end of the first year the yearly tenancy would never have
begun. Alternatively it might be decided that the tenancy is good for
two years or is terminable without notice at the end of the first year.
Both alternatives have received support2 It would seem that when the
tehancy created was ab initio from year to year a further factor would
have to be considered. The common law fixed a half year's notice as
proper to terminate the tenancy. The effect of this would seem to be
to permit a half year's notice prior to the end of the first year so as to
prevent a tenancy arising for another year.28
In this type of tenancy a strong apology can be made that the parties
intend a continuous tenancy:
"The doctrine of these authorities, when analysed, amount to this: that
when a tenancy from year to year is created by the agreement of the parties,
it continues until terminated by a legal notice. The estate does not depend
upon a continuance of possession; for the tenant cannot put an end to the
tenancy, or his liability for rent, by withdrawing from the occupancy of the
premises. The notice is a condition of the contract, in the language of these
authorities, arising out of it, which must be complied with, in order to absolve
him from further responsibility." 29
And therefore it has been held that there is no misjoinder in joining a
count for rent due prior to the death of the lessee with a count for rent
price of houses and tenements in these new towns and cities is ever fluctuating. A business
house on a particular street or in a particular part of the town may command a high
rent one month, and a low renf the next, and vicl versa, dependent on the increase or de-
crease of business in particular parts of town. Therefore, the terms of leasing were made
short-for the most part per month-in order to provide against loss to either landlord
or tenant." Hurd et al. v. Whitsett, 4 Colo. 77, 86-87 (1878).
27. Doe d. Clarke v. Smaridge, 7 Q. B. 957, 115 Eng. Reprints 748 (1845) (2 years);
Dunphy v. Goodlander, 12 Ind. App. 609, 40 N. E. 924 (1895) (one year); WILLIAA1,
CANADLAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT (2d ed. 1934) 119; WooDNALL, LAW or
LANDLORD AND TENANT (3d ed. 1934) 437-439.
28. Doe d. Plumer v. Mainby, 10 Q. B. 473, 10 Eng. Rep. 180 (1847).
29. Pugsley v. Aikin, 11 N. Y. 494, 496 (1854).
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accruing for several years thereafter during which executors gave no
notice to quit.30
The question might arise whether, in the presence of a statute of frauds
precluding a parol lease for more than one year, an express tenancy from
year to year could be created by parol of the term be deemed one for at
least two years and the tenancy a continuous one.
Unlike the forms of a periodic tenancy which arise by implication an
express agreement for a periodic tenancy would seem possible without the
reservation of any rent-an almost indispensable requirement where
periodic tenancies are implied. An express statement as to length of the
successive periods should override any continuous implications arising
from the fixation or payment of rent at other periods. An oral agreement
during the periodic tenancy that it should end at a fixed date is without
consideration. 1 Unlike a tenancy at will death of the lessor or of the
lessee is not considered to terminate the tenancy 2
II Where the Agreement of Letting
Does Not Fix any Duration for the Term
While the year is still the commonly denoted space of time in a lease,
modem conditions have pushed the month to a position of almost equal
importance. The length of the term of moderately and low priced apart-
ments is commonly left to the whim of the gods, but the rent is "so much"
per month. In an industrial democracy the individual may well be chary
of tying himself down as a tenant to any one place-his job may be here
today, elsewhere the next, or gone entirely.3 If he works his income is
wont to be regular and fixed in weekly or bimonthly units; his ability to
pay rent from month to month varies little; the month is likely to be the
measure of his obligation to pay rent. Under such circumstances, and,
in general, in the absence of countervailing indicia, a tenancy from month
to month would seem called for wherever the only indication of the
term is the monthly rental payments.'
The length of notice required to excise a periodic tenancy seems
30. Pugsley v. Aikin, 11 N. Y. 494 (1854).
31. Sidebothom v. Holland, [1895] 1 Q. B. 378.
32. Pugsley v. Aikin, 11 N. Y. 494 (1854). See note 105, infra. The lea-ehold may be
assigned or sublet, Pike v. Eyre, 9 B. & C. 909, 109 Eng. Reprints 338 (1829).
33. Thus in Johnson v. Solway, 2 W. W. R.. 75 (Can. 1933) upon a change in his
employer's location the tenant found himself about two miles away from work.
34. Edmundson v. Preville, 12 Colo. App. 73, 54 Pac. 394 (189S); Steffens v. Earl,
11 Vroom. (N. J.) 128 (1878); Yoshida v. Security Ins. Co., 145 Or. 325, 26 Pac. (2d)
1082 (1933); Hollis v. Burns, 100 Pa. St. 206 (1882); Elliott v. Birrell, 127 Va. 136,
102 S. E. 762 (1920); Methodist Church v. Roach, 9 W. L. R. 23 (Can. 1903). For a
statutory disinclination for periodical tenancies of yearly length, Ariz. REv. Coon AM.
(Struckmeyer, 1928) §§ 1956, 1957. But see Maynard v. Campbell, 115 S. C. 256, 105 S.
E. 351 (1920).
19381
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to have been determined by the usage of the community, the usage in
turn crystallizing into a custom which ultimately became an established
rule of law. Since a reasonable period of notice has a wide appeal where
the parties.are not in default, the notice to quit has become the outstand-
ing characteristic of the periodic tenancy. In the case of a tenancy from
year to year good husbandry fixed a half year as a proper notice. With al-
most equal readiness but with less pragmatic justification the courts have
adopted a month's notice as requisite to terminate a monthly tenancy
and a week's notice to end a weekly tenancy. 8 It has seemed better to
the courts to adopt a uniform length of notice than to leave to each
court or jury the question of reasonableness of the notice.8" A few
courts still incline to find a "reasonable" notice sufficient to terminate
a monthly, 7 or weekly tenancy.38  It should be remarked that the terms
of an indefinite tenancy may be such as to negate the existence of any
periodic tenancy.3"
There is a tendency among certain courts, particularly those of New
York, to make a distinction between a "monthly hiring" or one "by the
month" and one from month to month.40 In the first case a recurrent
35. "By strict relativeness, the rule of a half year's notice in tenancies from year to
year, would only require a hdIf month's or a half week's notice in cases of monthly or
weekly tenancies. The briefness of the latter, and the length of the former kind of tenancies.
was the probable reason why the rule was not uniform. Whatever the reason of the
rule, it seems to have been well grounded in the general understanding of the English
people." Steffens v. Earl, 40 N. J. L. 128, 133-134 (1878).
36. Johnson v. Solway, 2 W. W. R. 75 (Can. 1933).
37. Davis v. Fraser & Shaw, 61 D. L. R. 48 (Can. 1920). And in respect to a tenancy
from year to year it has been said: "At common law it was necessary to give six months'
notice in order to terminate a tenancy from year to year. This rule has not, however,
been adopted in this and a number of other states. An impression has prevailed in our
state for a long time that it is necessary to give three months' notice in order to
terminate a tenancy from year to year, although we have no statute providing for
such notice. . . . In the absence of a statute requiring three months' notice . . . we
are bound to hold that the circuit judge was in error in charging the jury that
three months was necessary in order to terminate a tenancy from year to year.
His honor should have charged that it was only necessary to give reasonable notice, and
should have left it to the jury to say whether, in view of all the facts and circumstances
of this case, reasonable notice was given." Jones v. Spartanburg Herald Co., 44 S. C.
526, 531, 22 S. E. 731, 733 (1895).
38. Mornane v. All Red Carrying Co., V. L. R. 341 (Can. 1935).
39. Sheldon v. Jones, 42 Vt. 638 (1870).
40. Hand v. Knaul, 116 Misc. 714, 191 N. Y. Supp. 667 (Co. Ct. 1921); Boyar v.
Wallenberg, 132 Misc. 116, 228 N. Y. Supp. 358 (City Ct. 1928). See letter of Max ICatz,
N. Y. L. J., Oct. 8, 1936, p. 1064, col. 2. In one court it was argued that when one pays
rent each month in advance there is a renting of the premises for the month for which
the rent is paid; his term is a month which he renews at the beginning of each month.
Ludington v. Garlock, 5 Sitv. Sup. Ct. Rep. 532 (N. Y. 1890). Since rent is very widely
paid in advance at the present day this reasoning would make it difficult to find a tenancy
from period to period in this type of case. There are many New York cases in which a
month's notice has been required without any discussion of this point and it is believed
that the courts of the State would not readily make this distinction.
[Vol, 7
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tenancy terminable without notice to quit is found, in the other a con-
tinuous tenancy subject to termination by a notice to quit. Under some
circumstances this distinction may be warranted;" but as a general
proposition it is objectionable. A trial, the determination of which rests
upon whether the parties agreed upon a "monthly hiring" or "a hiring
from month to month" is not to be regarded with favor. Astute counsel
will allege in his pleadings and try to prove that the tenancy was "for
a month" or "from period to period" as best befits the theory of his
case.i Even if terms such as "monthly" are used, in the absence of
stronger evidence, it would seem wiser to consider them to be inter-
changeable as they are likely to be so considered by the partiesY1
Where there is a tenancy from month to month an eviction by the
lessor in the middle of a month will permit the tenant to recover damages
for at least a month and a half.44
An indefinite tenancy of this sort may arise from the failure of nego-
tiations for a lease for a definite period and where there has been no
meeting of the minds as to the amount of rent it has been held that a
quantum mermit recovery might be hadV4
It is often difficult to tell whether there is an express tenancy from
period to period or one which has arisen by implication. Express tenan-
cies from period to period need not be in haec verba G but even a written
41. It is possible for a tenant who wishes to try out the premises to agree to pay a
month's rent for a month's trial and if satisfied at the end of the month to continue
his tenancy paying rent monthly. In such case there is a warrantable distinction between
the nature of his occupation during the first month and that which occurs thereafter.
Gibbons v. Dayton, 4 Hun. 451 (N. Y. 1875). There is no prohibition against a leasing
for a month and if such hiring actually exists, there is, of course, no requirement of a
notice to quit. People v. Goelet, 64 Barb. 476 (N. Y. 1873). For another case having
special facts negating the inference of a monthly tenancy, see Toch v. Horowitz, 87 N. Y.
Supp. 455 (1904).
42. Thus in Finkelstein v. Herson, 55 N. J. L. 217, 26 At. 638 (1893), the allegation
was of a letting for "the term of one month and month to month thereafter." A statute
provided that in cases of indefinite lettings where no term was fixed three months' notice
necessary or the term was good until the following April, held, the statute was inappllcabLe
since this was a letting for a definite term. See Williams v. Apothecaries Hall Co., SO
Conn. 503, 69 At. 12 (1903). But in Rothschild v. Williamson, 83 Ind. 337 (1332), where
the lessor claimed a definite tenancy for two months and a holdover thereafter, the court
found an indefinite tenancy as maintained by the defendant.
43. The terms yearly, monthly, and weekly, are commonly taken to mean from priod
to period. See Miller v. Lowe, 86 N. Y. Supp. 16 (Sup. Ct. 1904); Queens Club Gardens
Estates v. Bignell, [1924] 1 K. B. 117.
In New York, the Law Revision Commission is studying the question of notice to quit
in tenancies. New York is among the minority of states which have statutory provi ona
for notice to quit in cases of tenancies at will or at sufferance but none as to p2riodic
fenandes.
44. Willard v. Cunningham Bro., 172 Wash. 386, 20 P. (2d) 35 (1933).
45. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Thrower, 155 Wash. 613, 285 Pac. 654 (1930).
46. Pugsley v. Aikin, 11 N. Y. 494 (1854).
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agreement may lend itself to several interpretations. 4 For most pur-
poses it will not matter whether the periodic tenancy is held to spring
from an express agreement to that effect or from a presumption resting
upon the surrounding circumstances. 4 8 The answer to this question may,
however, be important in states where only express tenancies from year
to year are recognized, as well as in jurisdictions which sharply differ-
entiate written from oral leases.
Another troublesome problem of the interpretation arises where there
is an agreement for occupancy and the payment of periodic rent but
the tenant is to occupy as long as he pays rent or until some other con-
tingency. It is possible to argue for a life tenancy, a periodic tenancy,
or one at will." The solution would seem to rest upon the circumstances
of the particular tenancy, with factors such as erection of improvements,
the amount of rent reserved, the nature of the property demised, and the
pertinent statutes in the jurisdiction, being given due weight."0
Tenancies express and implied from week to week have been com-
mon in England"' and in Ireland."" They are to be found also in the
United States. In college towns they are of frequent occurrence. Strangely
enough, in England it was long uncertain what notice to quit was neces-
sary to end the weekly tenancy. That is, whether any reasonable notice
would suffice or whether a week's notice terminating with the end of a
weekly period was requisite. The latter alternative has been favored
of late and probably now represents the English view. 3 In the United
States there are comparatively few reported cases involving weekly
tenancies but it is probable that a week's notice would be required gen-
erally.54
A yearly tenancy of this sort is terminable by six months' notice to
47. The agreement may be considered too indefinite to be enforced.
48. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Thrower, 155 Wash. 613, 285 Pac. 654 (1930).
49. In Idalia Realty & Dev. Co. v. Norman, 232 Mo. 663, 135 S. W. 47 (1911), there
was a lease of a mill site for a period of five years, "together with the privilege of rent-
ing" it at a specified sum per year "after the expiration of this contract, until the mill is
removed" held, tenancy from year to year created by holding over after fixed period, and
not a tenancy at will. Accord: Holcombe v. Lorino, 124 Tex. 446, 79 S. IV. (2d) 307
(1935). Cf. (1935) 14 TEx. L. Rtv. 109, criticizing Second National Bank v. Merrill Co.,
69 Wis. 501, 34 N. W. 514 (1887). See annotation on the character of tenancy created by
a letting unil the happening of a specified event. Notes (1911) 34- L. R. A. (N. S.) 1069.
50. In most of such cases a jury might properly be made the final arbiter under proper
instructions from the court.
51. See Queen's Club Gardens Estates v. Bignell, [1924J 1 K. B. 117; Note Weekly
Tenancies and'Notice to Quit (1924) L. T. 166; Mellows v. Low, [1923] 1 X. B. 522.
52. See Harvey v. Copeland, L. R. 30 Ir. 412 (1892), where the court says such
fenancies are frequent because the lessor can retain control over the premises very readily.
53. See note 3, supra.
54. The amounts involved will generally not warrant court action.
[Vol. 7
PERIODIC TENANCIES
quit to expire at the termination of the rental yearY5 Where the nature
of the occupancy and the circumstances attending the origin of the
tenancy so justify, and implication of a tenancy from year to year will
be made;"0 but the tendency when the holding is of urban property is
to find a periodic tenancy for shorter periods than a year.
Here too, death does not destroy the tenancy and an assignment or
sublease of the term is permissible as is a transfer of the interest of the
landlord."' The present day usage of paying rent in advance lends sup-
port to treating such tenancies as having higher significance than tenancies
at will. In this type of periodic tenancy it would seem that a continuous
tenancy should be found since in all likelihood the parties envisage a ten-
ancy enduring until terminated by one or the other." It has been held
that a day to day tenancy does not require a notice to quit for its term-
ination. 0
III Where the Tenancy Arises from a Holding Over
Where a tenant holds over after the termination of a tenancy for a
definite period the law usually gives the lessor several alternatives. He
may regard the holdover as a trespasser, a tenant at sufferance, or as a
tenant for another period similar to the elapsed term or as a tenant for
another year.6 ' But where the holdover pays periodic rent a tenancy from
period to period is generally implied; if the prior term was for a period
of more than a year the successive periods implied are not presumed to
55. Eberlein v. Abel, 10 Ill. App. 626 (1882); Walker v. Oram, 3 D. L. R. 734 (Can.
1929).
56. Roberson v. Simons, 100 Ga. 424, 34 S. E. 604 (1S99); Hamilton v. Federal Land
Bank, 175 Miss. 462, 167 So. 642 (1936); Stoltze Land Co. v. Westberg, 63 Mont. 38,
206 Pac. 407 (1922); Second National Bank v. Merrill Co., 69 Wis. 501, 34 N. W. 514
(1887).
57. See note 34, supra.
58. Richardson v. Neblett, 122 Mliss. 723, 84 So. 695 (1920); Allcoch v. Moorhoufe,
9 Q. B. D. 366 (1882).
59. Strong v. Soodvoisky, 141 flI. App. 183 (1908); Boyar v. Wallenberg, 132 M ic.
116, 22S N. Y. Supp. (City Ct. 1928). In MlacDonough v. Starbird, 105 CaL 15, 38 Pac.
510 (1894), A purchased the lessor's interest without knowledge of an agreement between
his transferor and the tenant concerning the fixtures. It was held in a suit involing the
right to the fixtures that the fact that after the transfer rent was paid to and accepted
by the purchaser, A, did not create a new tenancy but merely continued the old. Contra:
Donk Bros. Coal Co. v. Leavitt, 109 MII. App. 3835 (1903)-like Strong v. Soodvois'y, 141
Ill. App. 183 (1908), supra note 59, this was a suit for personal injuries. See note 17,
supra.
60. Day v. Smith, 46 Wyo. 515, 30 P. (2d) 786 (1934).
61. Fetting Mfg. Jewelry Co. v. Waltz, 160 Md. 50, 152 AUt. 434 (1930); Beach
Realty Co. v. Wildwood, 105 N. J. L. 317, 144 AtI. 720 (1929); Murrill v. Palmer, 164
N. C. 50, 80 S. E. 551 (1913); Finif v. Gearing, 106 Pa. Super. 419, 162 AfU. 325 (1932),
noted (1933) 7 TMIEa L. Q. 519.
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be more extensive than a year. 2 However, when the original lease is
for the term of one year or years, normally a tenancy from year to year
is implied and not a periodicity equal to the rental intervals. 8 In a few
states, where the prior lease has fixed regular monthly rental payments
as such without making them aliquot parts of a yearly sum, a month to
month tenancy has been found.64 A holdover, it should be noted, may
occur under. circumstances which refute an implication of either of the
above alternatives.65
It can be seen that at least as to the first holdover period an argument
may be advanced that there is a tenancy for a definite term-one year
-on the theory that the prior tenancy has been renewed. The argu-
ment has less force when the original fixed term was for more than a
year. But it has been said:66
"Upon principle and authority we conclude that a tenancy from year to
year, created by the tenant's holding over after the expiration of his original
term, is a new term for each year of such holding over upon the terms of the
original lease so far as they are applicable to the new relation. It follows that
a claim for unpaid rent of each year of such holding over creates a separate and
distinct cause of action."
The soundness of this view may be questioned. However valid as to
the first period after the original demise, where an informal relationship
of landlord and tenant has endured for several periods, it is unlikely that
62. "Hunter v. Frost, 47 Minn. 1, 49 N. W. 327 (1891), where the original term was
for thirteen months.
63. Tolle v. Orth, 75 Ind. 298, 39 Am. Rep. 147 (1881); Hatley v. Myers, 96 Ill.
App. 217 (1901); Murrill v. Palmer, 164 N. C. 50, 80 S. E. 551 (1913); Strelt v. Fay,
230 fIl. 319, 82 N. E. 648 (1907); Hamburg v. Cape Breton Elec. Co., 4 D. L. R. 683
(Can. 1926).
Thus, if during the early part of the year of the holdover an agreement is made for the
reduction of rent, absence of consideration because the parties are bound for a year is
a good defense to a claim on such agreement. Goldsbrough v. Gable, 140 Ill. 269, 29 N. E.
722 (1892). See Notes (1936) 108 A. L. R. 1464.
In Madison Bldg. Ass'n v. Eckert, 49 Ohio App. 210, 196 N. E. 789 (1934) the court
on facts similar to these of Goldsbrough v. Gable, spra, reached an opposite result by
finding the tenancy to be one from month to month.
64. Barium v. Berger, 125 Mich. 572, 84 N. W. 1070 (1901); Madison Bldg. As'n v.
Eckert, 49 Ohio App. 210, 196 N. E. 789 (1934); Elkins Nat. Bank v. Nefflen, 188 S. E.
750 (W. Va. 1936), noted, (1937) 43 W. Va. L. Q. 339. See Hammon v. Douglas, 50 Mo.
434, 437 (1872). In Ladies Hosiery & Underwear Co. v. Parker, [19301 1 Ch. 304, there
was a lease for three years at so much per week. A holdover took place. The lower
court thought that this was a week to week tenancy, not one from year to year, but the
Court of Appeal found it unnecessary to decide this question.
65. Salomon v. O'Donnell, 5 Colo. App. 35, 36 Pac. 893 (1894) (agreement for occu-
pation pending litigation); Leonard v. Spicer Mfg. Co., 103 N. J. L. 391, 139 At. 15
(1927) (lessor asserted renewal of former term and lessee asseverated that the holding
over was a mistake).
66. Kennedy v. New York, 196 N. Y. 19, 25, 89 N. E. 360, 362 (1909).
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the parties view the tenancy as one with definite time limits and termin-
able without notice at the end of a period. In England no distinction
appears to be made between this type of periodic tenancy and other
forms. 67 It has been said that in the United States such holdover tenan-
des are generally held not to be continuous but rather a series of recur-
rent tenancies.6 It must be admitted that there are a number of cases
which have not distinguished a situation in which the cause of action
arises in the first period from that in which a right of action accrues in
a subsequent period. 69 Consistency with this view would require that no
notice to quit be given.70 In probably the majority of jurisdictions, how-
ever, either by statute or judicial holding a notice to quit is required to
terminate the holdover tenancy.m
Ordinarily the holdover tenancy will begin upon an anniversary of
the commencement of the original term but this is not so where the prior
leasing is for some period and a fraction. In such case the notice should
have for its anniversary the date of the original holding over rather than
the date of the original lease.72 The length of notice required is similar
to that required to terminate other forms of periodic tenancies. 3
Acknowledgment of the holdover by the lessor does not effect a term
good for two years: it is terminable by six months' notice in the first year
of the holding over.74
67. There is considerable case material in England on periodic tenancide and the cases
from that jurisdiction cited in this article do not appear to mahe a distinction between
this form of periodic tenancy and other forms.
68. See Notes (1922) 8 VA. L. Rnv. 213, (1935) 21 Va. L. Rev. 582.
69. City Coal Co. v. Marcus, 95 Conn. 454, 111 AUt. 857 (1920); Rice v. Atldnon-
Deacon-Elliott Co., 215 Mlich. 371, 183 N. W. 762 (1921). In Peope's Trust Co. v.
Oates, 6S F. (2d) 353 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934) a tenant's holding over was held to create a
new tenancy from year to year and not a continuation of the original tenancy. Therefore,
a trust deed lien acquired and recorded during the original term was held superior to a
lessor's lien for rent accruing during the holdover. The writer does not mean to advocate
that no notice be required during the first period-to the contrary.
70. Gladwell v. Holcombe, 60 Ohio St. 427, 54 N. E. 473 (1899); Park v. Castie, 19
How. Pr. 29 (N. Y. 1860).
71. Tredick v. Birrer, 109 Kan. 483, 200 Pac. 272 (1921). See cases cited in this
footnote on the question of length and time of notice. In Corson v. Berson, 86 Cal. 433,
25 Pac. 7 (1S90), an agreement during one of the months of the holdover for a reduc-
tion in rent was held to be binding in each of the subsequent months, but the original
letting expressly provided that if the lessee held over the tenancy should be from month
to month.
In Hunter v. Frost, 47 Minn. 1, 49 N. W. 327 (1891), the court has an interesting
discussion on this point. There is considerable conflict. Does each holding over by a
tenant after expiration of a ferm for years constitute a new and separate term, distinct
from that which preceded or followed? See Notes (1910) 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) Z47.
72. Croft v. Blay, [1919] 1 Ch. 277, noted, (1920) 18 Mcmr L. REv. 336.
73. Heckel v. Griese, 12 N. J. Misc. 211, 171 AtL 143 (1934) (six months' notice for
year to year tenancy).
74. Doe v. Smaridge, 7 Q. B. 957 (1845). Nor does an agreement during the holdover
19381
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7
Where a lease provides for a renewal upon the giving of prescribed
notice before the end of the term, a holding over without such notice
is likely to be interpreted as initiating a periodic tenancy." Where no
preliminary notice is required a holding over is prone to be considered
as a renewal of the lease for the duration provided in the renewal clause.70
Inconspicuously interred in the crowded verbiage of the normal lease
frequently is found a clause renewing the lease unless notice prior to its
termination is given by the tenant. Such automatic renewals have been
outlawed in New York by a statute which renders such provision inop-
perative unless the tenant gives a notice to quit or the lessor gives a
notice calling the tenant's attention to the provision." It would seem
that even though this statute is not complied with, an implication of
a common law periodic tenancy would not be prevented. 78  In these
periodic tenancies the terms of the original lease are deemed to be in-
corporated to the extent that such terms are not utterly inconsistant
with the nature of the tenancy.79 Change of one of the terms of the
original lease will not prevent the application of the other terms.8" It
has been held that a lessor cannot change the nature of a monthly
tenancy to one from year to year by notice to that effect if the lessee
stayed over.8 ' Like other forms of periodic tenancies this one may be
for an increase in rent create a new leasing which would give the holdover a right for a
term of two years. Doe v. Geekie, 5 Q. B. 841 (1844).
75. Weiss v. H. C. Bohack Co., N. Y. L. J., Oct. 24, 1936, p. 1355, col. 5; Mansfield
Motors Inc. v. Freer, 42 Ohio App. 214, 182 N. E. 51 (1932). But see, Leonard v. Spicer
Mfg. Co., 103 N. J. L. 391, 139 At]. 15 (1927), criticized, (1928) 28 CoL. L. R-v. 508.
76. Montgomery v. Bd. of Commissioners, 76 Ind. 362, 40 Am. Rep. 250 (1881);
Weber v. C & C Dry Goods Co., 253 Ky. 439, 69 S. W. (2d) 731 (1934); Kelly v. Varnes,
52 App. Div. 100, 64 N. Y.-Supp. 1040 (4th Dep't 1900). In several states there are
statutes providing that there shall be no renewal implied from a holding over.
77. N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW (1934) § 230.
78. Johnson v. Bjerregaard, 158 Misc. 436, 285 N. Y. Supp. 581 (Sup. Ct. 1936);
Ginsberg Realty Co. v. Greenstein, 157 Misc. 148, 283 N. Y. Supp. 100 (Mun. Ct. 1935).
The point is discussed in the New York Law journal, Jan. 25, 1936, p. 450, col. 2.
79. Walsh v. Soller, 207 Ind. 82, 190 N. E. 61 (1934) (provision that upon termina-
tion of the tenancy it should end without notice); Fetting Mfg. jewelry Co. v. Waltz, 160
Md. 50, 152 Atl. 434 (1930) (rent); Lowther v. Clifford, (1927J 1 K. B. 130 (assess-
ments). The following terms of the original holding held not inconsistent with the periodic
tenancy are listed in WmrLIs, CANADA r LAW oF LANDLORD AND TENANT (2d ed. 1934):
covenant to pay rent in advance; stipulation for abatement of rent in case of damages
to premises by fire; covenant to keep the premises in repair; stipulation as to rotation of
crops and other husbandry covenants; covenant not to sublet; stipulation as to notice
to quit; and arbitration clause. An option to purchase the fee, however, has been held
not included. Bradbury v. Grimble, [1920) 2 Ch. 548, criticized, (1921) 34 HAnv. L. Rnv.
437.
80. Zippar v. Reppy, 15 Colo. 260, 25 Pac. 164 (1890) (increase in rent).
81. Hurd v. Whitsett, 4 Colo. 77 (1878). The lower court had instructed that If
the lessee stayed over after notice, the effect of the notice would be to change the
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assigned or sublet and is not terminated by the death of either party.82
IV Where the Tenancy Arises from Possession Under an Invalid Lease
Generally the invalidity of the lease rests in its failure to satisfy the
Statute of Frauds but invalidity may be the result of illegality, or some
other reason.s3
When confronted with a lease invalid because of the Statute of
Frauds, the courts have a difficult problem to solve. On the one hand
is the policy of the Statute of Frauds, on the other, the fact that the
land has been occupied under a relationship called into being by the
invalid lease and regulated by its provisions. This difficulty is increased
by the wide variations in the Statute of Frauds in the different states.
In some states only leases for more than three years are within the
ambit of the Statute; in other states leases for more than a year need a
writing; in others all leases are required to be in writing or be tenancies
at will; in some states leases within the Statute are expressly stated to
be tenancies at will; in many states there is no statutory expression as
to the effect of lease within the Statute of Frauds. It is not altogether
to be wondered at that decisions in the various states in dealing with
this point arrive at conclusions not readily reconcilable. In New York
this question has been exceedingly troublesome for the courts to resolve
with the result that the law of that state is uncertain upon this question!'
The courts generally find a tenancy from year to year even under
statutes which prescribe that the tenancy arising thereunder shall be
at will; 5 although there are some courts which seem to prefer to follow
monthly tenancy to a tenancy from year to year. For a statute dealing with this point,
see Moa-r. RLV. CODE Aix. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 6769.
82. Castleton v. Samuel, 5 Esp. 173, 170 Eng. Reprints 776 (1804); Oxley v. James,
13 Ml. & W. 209, 153 Eng. Reprints 87 (1844).
83. Wineburgh v. Toledo Corp., 125 Ohio St. 219, 131 N. E. 20 (1932). None of the
cases in this section relate to the question of an illegal lease. Whether any right is po-ible
under such lease will depend upon the nature of illegality and the extent of the wrong
of the party attempting to assert the right.
84. Cases have held or stated that there is a tenancy from year to year which
requires a notice to quit. Fougera v. Cohn, 43 Hun. 454 (N. Y. 18S7); Laughran v.
Smith, 75 N. Y. 205 (1878); Reeder v. Sayre, 70 N. Y. IS0 (1877); that no notice is
required, Adams v. City of Cohoes, 127 N. Y. 175, 23 N. E. 25 (1891). The invalidleas
is good for a year, Kernochan v. Wilkens, 8 App. Div. 596, 3S N. Y. Supp. 236 (1st Dep't
1896); Blumenthal v. Bloomingdale, 100 N. Y. 558, 3 N. E. 292 (1855); Adams v. City
of Cohoes, supra. Contra: Laughran v. Smith, supra; Thomas v. Nelson, 69 N. Y. 118
(1877); Talamo v. Spitzmiller, 120 N. Y. 37, 23 N. E. 980 (1890).
35. The theory is: that which is at first a tenancy at will becomes, by continuance
of occupation and payment of periodic rents a tenancy from period to period. Larkin v.
Avery, 23 Conn. 304 (1854); Kroeger v. Bohrer, 116 Mo. App. 203, 91 S. W. 159 (1905);
Barlow v. Wainwright, 22 Vt. 88 (1849). It may be a difficult question at times as to
how long a time must elapse before a court could find a periodic tenancy but the do-e
case would seem to be the proverbial hard nuf to crack given to a jury. Dumn v. Rother-
mel, 112 Pa. 272, 3 All. 800 (1886). Where the statute covered leases of less than a years
1938]
FORDIJAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7
the literal wording of the statute designating the estate as one at will."
Since the invalid agreement is generally one envisaging a tenancy for
more than one year with an annual rental payable in aliquot units of
the year the courts customarily find a periodic tenancy for periods of a
year.87
The agreement being invalid, occupation and payment of rent should
be requisite to spell out the tenancy from year to year. 8 The absence
of periodic rent is persuasive of the existence of a tenancy at will rather
than one from year to year.89 The time of entry and not the time of ex-
ecution of the invalid agreement is the point on the yardstick from which
to ascertain the end of the period.2 0
An early case in New York in a memorandum opinion took the posi-
tion that a tenant, in possession under an agreement invalid under the
Statute of Frauds, who pays rent monthly, is a tenant from month to
month, and such tenancy may be cut off by a month's notice expiring
with the end of some month, reckoning from the beginning of the ten-
anc. 91 Such a holding lacks justification unless the invalid lease did not
measure the term in yearly terms, or unless the question arose during
the first year of the holding. 2 In the latter case it will often be difficult
duration an oral leasing for 11 months at a monthly rental was held to be a tenancy
from month to month. Gerhart Realty Co. v. Welter, 108 Mo. App. 248, 83 S. W. 278
(1904). The court was somewhat uncertain whether it had before it a tenancy at will,
or one from month to month.
86. Ellis v. Paige, 1 Pick. 43 (Mass. 1822). Here the question arose during the first
year. In Hammon v. Douglas, 50 Mo. 434 (1872), the court expressed a preference for
the Massachusetts view but followed its contrary precedents.
87. Seaver Amusement Co. v. Sax, 210 Ill. App. 289 (1918); Coudert v. Cohn, 118
N. Y. 309, 23 N. E. 298 (1890). See 2 Tuosn'soN, REAr, PROPERTY, (1924) § 972; c/.
Union Oil Co. v. Walker, 150 Wash. 151, 272 Pac. 64 (1928) (invalid lease for two years
at monthly rental, held, tenancy from month to month).
88. This is true of other types of periodic tenancies which arise by implication.
89. Rich v. Bolton, 46 Vt. 84 (1873). In Talamo v. Spitzmiller, 120 N. Y. 37, 23
N. E. 980 (1890), A gave D a sealed lease for five years at annual rental payable in
monthly installments. D took the lease at P's verbal request, and upon oral understanding
that P and D should jointly use and occupy during the term and P to pay to D half
of the rent. D and P occupied from May, 1882 to November, 1882, when P quit. D paid
the monthly rent, P nothing. In. an action to recover proceeds of sale made by D of P's
goods, held, that a tenancy from year to year was not created, the primary element, pay-
ment of rent, being missing; P was merely a tenant at will.
90. Coudert v. Cohn, 118 N. Y. 309, 23 N. E. 298 (1890). So where a tenancy from
month to month is found. Tom Gung v. Fong Lee, 48 N. S. R. 317 (Can. 1915). This
is so where an agreement for a lease is not consummated. Prindle v. Anderson, 19 Wend.
391 (N. Y. 1838); Karsch v. Kalabza, 144 App. Div. 305, 128 N. Y. Supp. 1027 (2d
Dep't 1911). See Note (1921) 34 HARV. L. RiV. 437.
91. People v. Darling, 47 N. Y. 666 (1872). Accord: Gilfoyle v. Cahill, 18 Misc.
68, 41 N. Y. Supp. 29 (1st Dep't 1896).
92. The facts of the cases frequently do not indicate whether the cause of action arose
during the first or subsequent years.
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to imply a periodic tenancy of a year or lesser period since occupancy
will not have endured long enough to support the implication. The
courts might find a tenancy at will, a tenancy from rent interval to
rent interval, a tenancy for one year, a tenancy from year to year. 3 It
might be argued that the only evidence the court could receive as to
the nature of the tenancy would be the acts of the parties and other in-
ferential circumstances: if the rent were paid monthly this would be
strong evidence of a monthly tenancy; 4 if no rent were paid, of a
tenancy at will. 5 But since it is generally held that the tenant occupies
under the terms of the invalid lease 0 except as to its provisions con-
cerning duration the agreement as respecting the length of the term
might be shown not for the purpose of proving a tenancy for a definite
term but to evidence that a temporary occupation was not contemplated
and that the payment of rent was keyed to some period."' It has even
been said that during the period fixed the tenancy is one from year to
year and rental payments are not necessary to raise this implication0
Some courts have held that the invalid agreement may operate as
a valid agreement for the time which the statute permitted enforce-
able oral leases to be made. But this view would seem to emasculate the
Statute of Frauds and is not favored. 9
93. Talamo v. Spitzmiler, 120 N. Y. 37, 23 N. E. 980 (1890). In Greaton v. Smith,
1 Daly 380 (N. Y. 1860), D entered under an invalid lease of prescribcd duration for ten
years from May lst, occupied until October, paying a quarter's rent on August 1st; P sues
for rent of next quarter, held, no tenancy from year to year since no occupation or pay-
ment of rent had occurred for a year. Accord: Prial v. Entwbstle, 10 Daly 393 (N Y.
1882); Smith v. Genet, 2 City Ct. 8 (N. Y. 18M4). In Geiger v. Braun, 6 Daly 503 (N.
Y. 1876), there was an oral lease for 13 months; occupation for two months. The court
purported to follow People v. Darling, 47 N. Y. 665 (1872), and held this to be a
monthly tenancy requiring a month's notice by the tenant before quitting.
94. Geiger v. Braun, 6 Daly 506 (N. Y. 1876).
95. Greaton v. Smith, 1 Daly 380 (N. Y. 1860).
96. Marr v. Ray, 151 EI. 340, 37 N. E. 1029 (1894). This princip~e has been carried
to extreme lengths: Corbett v. Cochrane, 67 Conn. 570, 35 At. 509 (1S96) (agreement to
repair); Boardman Realty Co. v. Carlin, 82 Conn. 413, 74 At. 682 (1909) (agreement
to pay monthly rent); Freedman v. Gordon, 220 Mas. 324, 107 N. E. 9S2 (1915) (covenant
to pay increased rent for improvements); Doe d. Ricce v. Bell, 5 T. R. 471, 101 Eng.
Reprints 265 (1793) (time of year when lessee to quit binds le-zzee). But in Union Oil
Co. v. Walker, 150 Wash. 151, 272 Pac. 64 (1928), where an unacknowledged lease pro-
vided for a 30 day notice, it was held ineffective to prevent termination by 20 day statutory
notice.
97. The extent to which such evidence would be permitted would probably vary in
the several courts.
98. Griswold v. Branford, 80 Conn. 453, 68 At. 937 (1907). This is proper enough
if the invalid agreement may be shown in evidence to bring out the rental period. The
acts of the lessor may be such as to prevent him from showing or ameting a lease from
year to year. Greaton v. Smith, 1 Daly 380 (N. Y. 1860) (lessor refused to execute
lease and took possession prior to the end of the first year).
99. See Davis v. Pollock, 36 S .C. 544, 15 S. E. 718 (1892). See note 84, supra fo
similar New York cases.
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The question whether the action by the lessor to recover for the oc-
cupation is one for rent or one for use and occupation has not often
been raised in the courts but both actions have been permitted. 00 The
reason may be that recovery in most instances would be the same since
in the latter action the rental reserved in the lease is customarily used
to show the value and ordinarily that is the value adopted. But an
action on the contract in express as-sumpsit and one for use and occupa-
tion in implied assumpsit are not identical. A lessor suing on the
lease for rent would probably be estopped to deny an obligation of his
own under the lease.
"The courts generally hold that, where there is an entry and payment of
rent in advance for a fixed term under an oral lease, the lease is good for an
entire term, although the lease be a longer term than is permitted by the
statute."'10
And it has been held or stated by the courts of several jurisdictions
that the expirational date fixed in the invalid lease may be used to call
finis to the tenancy when that date arrives, without notice to quit.1 02 It
may be argued that, if the parties have abided by the agreement up to
the time of its designated termination, it would be folly at that time to
call the lease invalid and penalize one of the parties for having kept
his promise. But this argument has less force where the lease has been
questioned before its prescribed end: both parties are made aware of
its invalidity. Again, if one of the parties has defaulted an argument of
performance has less weight. Furthermore, since a periodic tenancy arises
from the occupation and payment of rent, normally, we may have the
anomalous situation of two contrary dates for the termination of the
tenancy during the last period fixed in the invalid lease.' 03  So, if
one of the parties should give a notice to quit requisite for a termination
100. Nash v. Berkmeir, 83 Ind. 536 (1882) (suit for rent); Barlow v. Wainwright,
22 Vt. 88 (1849) (use and occupation for period after abandonment). Accord: Marr v.
Ray, 151 Ill. 340, 37 N. E. 1029 (1894).
101. Watkins v. Balch, 41 Wash. 310, 83 Pac. 321 (1906).
102. Tracy v. Donovan, 37 Cal. App. 350, 174 Pac. 113 (1918); Ryan v. Mills, 129
Wash. 170, 88 N. W. 392 (1901). In New York it has been said after the expiration of
the invalid lease the lessee is a holdover and not entitled to a notice to quit-a rule which
in New York is applied to a holdover after a valid written or oral lease. This was stated
in Adams v. City of Cohoes, 127 N. Y. 175, 28 N. E. 25 (1891), a much debated case
in New York. In Barium v. Berger, 125 Mich. 504, 84 N. W. 1070 (1901), a verbal lease
for five years was fully performed. The court said that this could not be treated as an
invalid lease nor as a tenancy from year to year, and upon a holding over after five
years a monthly tenancy and not one from year to year was created.
103. In Coudert v. Cohn, 118 N. Y. 309, 23 N. E. 298 (1890), the term fixed by the
invalid lease was for two years and five months. The defendant argued that the time
of the termination of his tenancy was governed by the time designated in the lease as the
expiration of the term, held, tenants entering under a void lease become tenants from
year to year from the time of their entry.
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of a tenancy from year to year this would seem a refutation of the term
fixed by the lease and might be considered as extending or shortening that
term by the date fixed in the notice. The doctrine of part performance
or estoppel may be available to bind the parties to the terms of the lease
including that concerning duration'0 4
V The General Picture
At common law the characteristics cognate to all forms of periodic
tenancies are: (1) non-extinguishability by death of either lessor or
lessee;"0 5 (2) right to assign or sublet.'
Less uniformity is found in respect to the continuity of the tenancy
and the notice to quit. With the exception of tenancies arising from a
holdover, however, there is substantial accord in the requirement of some
notice to quit to terminate the periodic tenancy. 07 And a similar accord
is vouchsafed the requirement that the notice be given to expire with the
end of the period. 08
104. Rowland v. Cook, 179 Wash. 624, 38 P. (2d) 224 (1934) (part prformance);
Matzger v. Arcade Bldg. & Realty Co., 80 Wash. 401, 141 Pac. 900 (1914) (estoppel).
Notes (1906) 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 852.
105. Richardson v. Neblett, 122 Mliss. 723, 84 So. 695 (1920); Notes (1930) 63 A. L. R.
594. The obligation to give a notice to quit is imposed upon an infant heir. Madden d.
Baker v. White, 2 T. R. 159, 100 Eng. Reprints 86 (1787). Under modern methods of
administration that duty would seem to lie upon the personal representatives of the testa-
tor during the period of administration. Upon, the death of a lessee this interest paszs to
his personal representatives. Mellows v. Low, [1923] 1 K. B. 522 (week to week). That
notice was required to be given to an executor of the lessee at early common law was
not altogether dear, see Gulliver v. Burr, 1 W. BL 597, 96 Eng. Reprints 345 (1766).
106. Assignment: MacDonough v. Starbird, 105 Cal. 15, 33 Pac. 510 (1894); mt.
Palatine Academy v. Kleinschnitz, 28 Ill. 133 (1862); German State Bank v. Herron,
111 Iowa 25, 82 N. W. 430 (1900). Subleasing: Halliburton v. Molloy, 2 N. S. L. R. 246
(Can. 1854).
107. The cases are legion. For a recent case, see Wyatt v. Erny, 193 Ark. 479, 101
S. W. (2d.) 181 (1937).
108. Wyatt v. Emy, 193 Ark. 479, 101 S. W. (2d.) 181 (1937); Reck & iehl v.
Caufield, 129 Ky. 695, 112 S. W. 843 (1903); Hanks v. Workmaster, 75 N. J. L. 73,
66 At. 1097 (1907); Witherbee, Sherman & Co. v. Wykes, 159 App. Div. 24, 143 N. Y.
Supp. 1067 (3rd Dep't 1913). This is true even where by statute less than a period's
notice is required to terminate the tenancy. Wilson v. Wood, 84 Mfiss. 728, 36 So. 609
(1904).
In Wright v. Darby, 1 T. R. 159, 99 Eng. Reprints 1029 (1786), it was strenuously argucd
that even if such notice was required where the premises were ordinary lands it should
not be a prerequisite where a building was leased, but the court rejected the argument.
In Doe v. Donovan, 1 Taunt. 554, 127 Eng. Reprints 949 (1809), the court held that on
a letting of a house from year to year, to quit at a quarter's notice, the quarter must ex-
pire within a year of the tenancy. In Precious v. Reedie [1924] 2 K. B. 149, a monthly
tenancy began on the first of the month. September 5th, the tenant received a notice
dated September 1st giving him "one month's notice to quit." The notice was held de-
fective.
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The term is commonly understood to end at midnight of the last day. 00
It is generally held that although at common law the notice need not be
in writing," 0 it should specify the time of termination. Thus, where no
time is designated in the notice, the fact that abandonment takes place
before the time for which the notice should have been given and an
action is brought by the lessor after such time does not make the notice
effective."' A notice to quit sixty days after the notice has been held
bad;'1 2 likewise a notice designating a premature date." 8 But where a
notice is too long some courts will hold it effective." 4 A notice to quit
by a lessor has been held unneccessary to terminate the periodic tenancy
where the tenant has denied the existence of such tenancy; 1 5 or has him-
self given a notice to quit.""'
It has been said that it is an almost universal usage to name the
day corresponding to the day of the letting as the time for quitting and
that such notice is rarely questioned." 7 While largely true, this state-
ment does seem to be overly optimistic. There is an appreciable differ-
ence of opinion " as to whether a notice to quit on the last day of the
term is good since the tenant has the whole day in which to remain in
possession;" 9 whether a notice to quit on the anniversary of the term
is good since a new period has started to run; 20 and whether the notice
109. Necros v. Tedtman, 238 Ill. App. 220 (1925). A notice to end a monthly tenancy
served on April 3rd to vacate on or after May 31st has been held good, the lessee having
until midnight of the lasi day. Hyman Realty Co. v. Kahn, 199 Minn. 139, 271 N. W.
248 (1937). 1
110. Eberlein v. Abel, 10 I1. App. 626 (1883); Robinson v. Kuhen, 83 Pa. Super. 337
(1924).
111. Heckel v. Griese, 12 N. J. Misc. 211, 171 AtI. 148 (Sup. Ct. 1934); Bedell v. Clark,
151 I1. App. 419 (1909); Arbenz v. Exley, 57 W. Va. 580, 50 S. E. 813 (1905).
112. Gill v. Gill, 161 Ill. App. 221 (1911).
113. This is a common situation in which it has been held that a proper notice has
not been given. Tredick v. Birrer, 109 Kan. 488, 200 Pac. 272 (1921). But in Michigan
such notice would seem not ineffective under MfIciH. Comp. LAWS (1929) § 13492.
114. Wright v. Zachgo, 271 N. W. 512 (Iowa 1937); Hyman Realty Co. v. Kahn, 271
N. W. 248 (Minn. 1937). See Jones v. Rifter, 206 Il. App. 487, 489 (1922).
115. Vincent v. Corbin, 85 N. C. 108 (1881).
116. A. N. P. Realty Co. v. Tunick, 115 Misc. 190, 187 N. Y. Supp. 437 (1st Dep't 1921).
117. THozosoN, REAL PROPERTY (1924) § 160. Accord: Steffens v. Earl, 40 N. J. L.
128 (Sup. Ct. 1878). See Note (1921) 1 Wis. L. Rxv. 251. In Newman v. Slade, [1926J 2
K. B. 328, a weekly tenancy starting on a Monday was held terminated by a notice given
on one Monday for the next Monday. Harvey v. Copeland, L. R. 30 Ir. 412 (1892)
semble. (on or before). In both of the last cited cases the point was argued.
118. A comprehensive annotation on this question is contained in Notes (1933) 86
A. L. R. 1346.
119. In Petsch v. Biggs, 31 Minn. 392, 18 N. W. 101 (1884), a notice to quit April
30th, served on March 28th, was held good.
120. It might be embarrassing for a tenanf compelled to remove on the last day If he
desired to move into other premises occupied by a tenant who insisted upon remaining in
until 11:59 P. M.
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must be served before the prior period has ended. This is a metaphys-
ical bugbear which has been unnecessarily conjured up by the courts.
The tick of the midnight clock would seem loud enough to sanction a
notice for either day, and removal on either day. ' A notice for a calendar
period rather than for a lunar period is required to end the tenancy;1'2
and this is so under statutes requiring a month's notice to quit.'24
It has been held that a notice of an increase in rent must be of at
least the same length as the notice to quit.2 The lessor may by proper
notice condition the continuance of the tenancy upon payment of in-
creased rent which will bind an unresponsive lessee who retains posses-
sion; -12 ' and this would seem to be true even where the tenant has pro-
tested.2 On both of these last points the contrary argument that the
lessor, although he may terminate the tenancy entirely by a notice to
quit, he cannot change its terms, has received some supporL s23 If the
121. Thus, in Oesterreicher v. Robertson, 187 M nn. 497, 245 N. W. 825 (1932), the
court said that the first of the month was part of the notice, and since the notice must
end on the last day of April, a notice mailed March 31st and received April 1st to quit
before May 1st was ineffective. In Bedell v. Clark, i51 Ill. App. 419 (1909)) the court
asserted that the notice must begin not later than the last day preceding the month
at the end of which the tenancy is sought to be terminated, but held that where the notice
to quit designated the first day of the next month it was error to permit an action for po:-
session brought on that day. This last case was questioned in Necros v. Tedtman, 238
Ill. App. 220 (1925), where a sixty days' notice was given on Oct. 15th to quit on De.
15th, the period being from the 15th to the 15th. The court said that a tenancy from
month to month expires at midnight of the last day of the month, and notice should
call for cessation on that day but the tenant cannot talie advanage of the lessor's giving
an extra day.
In computing the number of days required for the notice, it is customary to begin with
the date of the conclusion of the tenancy (rent period) and not fronm the date of com-
mencement. In Hungerford v. Wagoner, 5 App. Div. 590, 39 N. Y. Supp. 369 (3rd Dep't
1896) a notice was given on Oct. 2nd and an action brought on Nov. 2nd. The notice,
was held not ineffective, and action could be maintained. Contra: Walker v. Sharp2, 96
Mass. 43 (1867).
122. Rodgers v. The Dock Co., 34 L. J. (N. S.) 165 (1885); Sidebothom v. Holland
[1895] 1 Q. B. 378; Steffens v. Earl, 40 N. J. L. 128 (Sup. Ct. 1878).
123. Salios v. Swiff, 25 Ga. App. 148, 102 S. E. 869 (1920); Oesterreicher v. Robert-
son, 187 Minn. 497, 245 N. W. 825 (1932). For the case of a weekly tenancy zee Newman
v. Slade [1926] 2 K. B. 328.
124. This is true in England without statute, Sidebothom v. Holland [1898] 1 Q. B. 373.
125. Rosenberg v. Radish, 191 N. Y. Supp. 701 (1920). It is so provided in Idaho
by statute. IDAHo CoDn A.aur. (1932) § 54-307.
126. See Notes (1937) 109 A. L. R. 212.
127. Abraham v. Gheehns, 205 Ky. 2S9, 265 S. W. 778 (1924). In some states statutes
provide for a change in the terms of a periodic tenancy upon a notice of prescribed length.
CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1935) § S27. But this statute has been held inapplicable to a
notice given before the expiration of a definite ferm. Colyear v. Tobriner, 7 Cal. (2d.)
735, 62 P. (2d.) 741 (1936).
128. Lane v. Greene, 21 Ohio App. 62, 152 N. E. 790 (1926); Notes (1937) 109 A. L. R.
213-215.
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notice is phrased in the alternative: to quit or pay increased rent, the
notice should be effective for either purpose but the courts are not in
accord. 29
It has been held that no covenant of quiet enjoyment is implied in a
periodic tenancy against eviction by paramount title upon cessation of
the lessor's interest. 8 ' In the absence of knowledge on the part of the
lessee of the lessor's title, it is submitted that such a covenant should
be implied but damages limited to the time between the eviction and
the time for which notice to quit could be given.
Born out of the needs of a social economy which has never confined
its agreements to a definitive writing the periodic tenancy has had a
long and honorable history. An attempt has been made in the foregoing
pages to describe its nature and to evaluate its place in our common law.
In a subsequent article the writer will discuss statutory regulation of this
form of tenancy.
129. Notes (1937) 109 A. L. R. 213-215.
130. Schwartz v. Lockett, 61 L. T. 719 (1889) (holdover); Penfold v. Abbott, 32 L, J.
Q. B. (N. S.) 67 (express tenancy). In both of these cases the lessor was himself a
lessee for a definite term and apparently the plaintiffs knew of their lessor's interest.
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